In particular, any attacker with access to the local host must be assumed to be able to learn the user’s PIN code, simply by intercepting communication with the OpenPGP card hardware or through key logging.

Alternatively, if the attacker has physical proximity to the card, it could wait for the device to be used normally over NFC and then learn the PIN code wirelessly and perform the attack at a later point.

If an attacker has gone through the trouble of obtaining physical access to a key, the conservative approach is to regard it is possible that the attacker were able to learn the PIN earlier since the PIN is often unprotected.

However its practical consequences are relatively small as a successful attack requires other privileged operations (such as local root access) that are normally not available to an attacker, and would have undermined the security anyway.

WTH!

This makes the applet completely worthless - anyone with physical access to the token can sign on my behalf, this completely defeats the purpose (which is NOT only to make the key unextractable, but to block the card if someone tries to break the PIN and make it worthless without it).

I will demand either an upgrade path or a token replacement.