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- Odd that the time lock doesnt start if you switched password/yubikey mode. The time lock feature should be completely separated. I will have to try and see if I can reproduce the problem.
This actually started working again later. Don't know what the hiccup was..
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- By design, its not possible to use two different yubikeys to decrypt the same notes due to the nature of how the encryption key system works.
I can see this being a problem. If the app is ever going to be used to store something at least slightly important, there must be a way to restore the contents in case the Yubikey is lost/destroyed/not working. At least with the current implementation of the static ID, there could be a way to enter it manually and unlock that way (provided the user has written the ID down for safekeeping earlier). Don't know what the backup could be with other modes though..
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+ Its practical because you dont need to program one of your Yubikey slots in a specific manner to make it work with YubiNotes.
Good point, especially so since the NEO can't use slot 2 with NFC. So could possible modes be:
- mode 1: Yubikey static ID, like it is now
- mode 2 Yubico OTP (has to be online, slower to authenticate)
- mode 3 Challenge-Response (has to have a dedicated NEO)
Does this make sense? Some other option to combine practicability and security?
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- The Device ID is unique but can be guessed. This is partially mitigated for by the fact that the device id is only one part of the encryption key system. (The other parts use the uniquely generated random device keys).
When you say guessed, do you mean the lenght of the ID which is quite short (=easier to bruteforce)?
How do the random device keys work/protect the memos? As far as I understand, the user
or the attacker only has to provide the Yubikey ID and the database will open?
Please bear with me with the crypto questions, I'm a complete noob when it comes to those..